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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
5

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

I
f

Local #376, UAW

I
I

t

Award

I

and

I
I

ColtIs Inc.

I

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 5, 1967 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The Company did not violate Article IX Section 15(b)
of the labor agreement dated August 5, 1967 when it
denied the bid of William Antonelli for the job of
"Inspector-Tool & Gage, Parts Measuring Machine" on
July 23, 1969.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February 1, 1971
STATE OF New York ) gg
COUNTY OF New York) ' "'
On this 1st day of February, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 12 30 0110 70
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Opinion

In accordance with Article XV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated August 5, 1967 between Colt's, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local #376, UAW,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate Article IX, Section 15(b)
of the labor agreement dated August 5, 1967, when
it denied the bid of William Antonelli for the
job of "Inspector-Tool & Gage, Parts Measuring
Machine" on July 23, 1969? If so what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Hartford, Connecticut on November 9, 1970 at which time Mr. Antonelli, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

oath was expressly waived.

The

parties filed post hearing briefs.
I do not find the Company's decision to by-pass the grievant in favor of a less senior bidder for the job in question
to be violative of the contract.
The job of "Inspector-Tool & Gage, Parts Measuring Machine"
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required the operation of a machine new to the plant - a
sophisticated electronic computer.

Article IX Section 15(b)

of the contract clearly required that the successful bidder
possess the ability to perform the job to which he bids at
the time he is assigned to it, without any formal training
period.

The pertinent part of that contract section calls

for the filling of such vacancies on the basis of seniority
"provided such employees have the ability to meet the requirements of the job classification."

It goes on to define

"ability" as meaning that the successful bidder must to able
to "perform the production requirements of the job at the
time the employee fills the vacancy."

(Emphasis added). Had

the parties intended to afford a senior bidder the opportunity to be trained on the job or a reasonable period of time
within which to learn and perform its duties satisfactorily,
they could and should have so provided within Article IX
Section 15(b) of the contract.

That they did not means that

the Company may reject a senior bidder in favor of one with
less seniority, if, as between the two, the latter is the only
one capable of performing the job upon assignment to it.
Under the circumstances involved in the instant case namely a new machine and a contractual provision requiring
the successful bidder to possess the ability to perform the
job duties without a formal training or "break-in" period^ it is well settled that an employer may use a test to judge
the abilities of the respective bidders; provided the test relates to the duties of the job involved, and is uniformly ad-

- 3 ministered to all bidders.

The test which the Company used

in the instant case fully met these standards.

There is no

dispute that Mr. Wichowski answered the questions and interpreted the job blueprints correctly; and that the grievant
and the other bidders did not.

As a result, in selecting Mr.

Wichowski, the Company made a reasonable choice not of the
bidder most qualified, but of the only bidder with the requisite ability.

Had the grievant demonstrated an ability to do

the job, albeit less qualified then Wichowski, he would have
been entitled to the appointment.

But that was not the case.

By failing to provide the correct answers to a test relevant
to the job he sought, the grievant failed to demonstrate the
threshold ability required by Article IX Section 15 (b) of the
contract.
Accordingly I cannot find that the Company's decision to
select Mr. Wichowski instead of the grievant was either arbitrary or unreasonable.

And therefore I do not find that it

violated Article IX Section 15(b) of the contract.
/"
grievance is denied.

The Union's

fric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

•
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers Union of America
Local Union No. 1-2, AFL-CIO
Award

and

of
Arbitrators

Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated December 1, 1968 to March 10,
1971 and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Award, as follows:
1. The parties shall calculate what percent of the
total Blue Cross premiums paid on and after
October 1, 1969, was paid by the employees.
2. That percent of the total amount of refunds and
payments received by the Company on and after
October 1, 1969 from Blue Cross under the second paragraph of sub-Section (b) Part 4 Exhibit 1 of the contract shall be placed in legal
escrow. The disposition of that escrow fund
shall be a matter for bargaining between the
parties at the expiration of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement under which they are presently working,
/

Eric 3. Schmertz
Chairman

Howard F a Lachenauer
Concurring
Dissenting

Harold T. Rigley
Concurring
Dissenting

DATED: December // 1971
STATE OF New York )Ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this //day of December, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: December
1971
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York) " "
On this
day of December, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Howard F. Lachenauer to me known and known
to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: December
1971
STATE OF New York ) s s > .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of December, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Harold T0 Rigley to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

'

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers Union of America,
Local Union No. 1-2, AFL-CIO
and
Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.

Opinion
of
Chairman

In accordance with Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated December 1, 1968 to March 10, 1971
between Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Utility Workers Unim
of America, Local Union No. 1-2, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as the Impartial Chairman of a three-man Board of Arbitration to hear and
decide, together with the Company and Union designees to said
Board, a dispute relating to Blue Cross refunds,
Messrs. Howard F. Lachenauer and Harold T0 Rigley served
respectively as the Company and Union Arbitrators on the Board
of Arbitration.
Hearings were held on November 3, December 7, 1970,
August 12, September 14 and September 24, 1971 at which times
representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
pressly waived.

The oath of the Arbitrators was ex-

The Board of Arbitration met in executive

session on October 8, 1971.

- 2The stipulated issue is:
Under Part 4, sub-Section (b) of Exhibit I of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, and in view of
the increased Blue Cross rates effective October 1,
1969, shall any portion of the refunds or payments
paid or payable under the second paragraph of subSection (b) be shared with all participating employees who are members of Local 1-2? If so to
what extent?
The parties stipulated in writing the following agreed to
facts:
Local 1-2 - Grievance re; Blue Cross.
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the
parties hereto:
I_. Prior to 1963, the Collective Bargaining Contract
provided that the entire cost of Blue Cross Premium
was borne by the employees, and the employees received the entire reimbursement if any granted by Blue
Cross„
II. Pursuant to Joint Exhibit II, for the year 1963
the Company paid one-half (1/2) of the premium cost
for Blue Cross-Blue Shield and the employee paid onehalf, and it was agreed to equally divide any refund
or reimbursement.
III. Starting January 1, 1964, the Company paid the
entire Blue Cross-Blue Shield premium and obtained
the entire refund or reimbursement, as provided by
Part 3 of Joint Exhibit II.
IV. As of July 1964, Blue Cross increased its rates,
which increase was paid by the employees pursuant to
subdivision (a) of Part 3 of Joint Exhibit II, which
provided that Company was to pay at the rate in force
as of the date of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,,
The increase amounted to $1.28 from $3.56 to $4.84 a
month on individual, and on family contract, $2.60 a
month increase from $8.72 to $11.320
V. For the calendar years 1964 and 1965, the Company
received the entire refund or reimbursement, pursuant
to Part 3 subdivision (a) of Joint Exhibit II.
VI. Under Joint Exhibit III under Part 4, at page 73,
paragraph (a) referring to Major Medical Insurance, it
was provided: "Recognizing the need for substantial financial assistance when serious injury or sickness
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strikes, the Company agrees to establish a Group Insurance Policy providing Major Medical coverage for
dependents of Employees on the regular active payroll,
to be maintained through the Mutual Aid Society."
VII. Subdivision (b) of Joint Exhibit III at page
74, in regard to Blue Cross and Blue Shield coverage
provides "The Company agrees to pay, effective as of
January 1, 1966, the premium therefor for the term
of this Contract, such payment to be at the premium
rate in force as of December 1, 1965," and that "The
Company will continue to receive or be credited with
any refunds or payments made to the Mutual Aid Society
by Blue Cross-Blue Shield on account of any hospital,
medical or surgical expense incurred primarily by the
Mutual Aid Society."
VIII. Joint Exhibit I, Part 4, subdivision (b) provides that "The Company agrees to continue to pay the
premiums for Blue Cross and the newly established (as
of Jan. 1, 1969) Group Health Insurance premiums for
the term of this contract, such payments to be at the
premium rates in force as of December 1, 1968," and "The
Company will continue to receive or be credited with any
refunds or payments made to the Mutual Aid Society by
Blue Cross and Group Health Insurance on account of any
hospital, medical or surgical expense incurred primarily by the Mutual Aid Society."
IX. Mutual Aid Society Funds are supplied by member
contributions, which are matched by the Company with
the Company having the additional obligation to pay any
deficit in the Mutual Aid Society operating funds,
X. On October 1, 1969, Blue Cross increased its rates
on individual contracts from $4.84 per month to $7.00
per month, an increase of $2.16; on family contracts,
the rate was increased from $11.32 per month to $15.80,
an increase of $4.48.
XI. The following refunds or reimbursements have been
made by Blue Cross to the Company through the Mutual
Aid Society pursuant to Part 4 (b) of Joint Exhibit I:
Period - 1969
1970
1970
1970
1970
1971

,

10/1/69
1/1/70
4/1/70
7/1/70
10/1/70
1/1/71

- 12/31/70
- 3/31/70
- 6/30/70
- 9/30/70
-12/31/70
- 3/28/71

$226,831.47
$168,189.38
$185,569.97
$176,828.75
$236,663.93
$205,922.18

- 4Part 4 sub-Section

(b) Exhibit I of the Collective Bar-

gaining Agreement reads:
(b) Blue Cross and New Group Health Insurance Coverage: The Company agreed to continue to pay the premiums for Blue Cross and the newly established (as of
January 1, 1969) Group Health Insurance premiums for
the term of the Contract, such payments to be at the
premium rates in force as of December 1, 1968.
The Company will continue to receive or be credited
with any refunds or payments made to the Mutual Aid
Society by Blue Cross and Group Health Insurance on
account of any hospital, medical or surgical expense
incurred primarily by the Mutual Aid Society0
It is the Union's contention that subsequent to October 1,
1969 that portion of the refunds or payments made to the Company (through the Mutual Aid Society) generated by the increase
in Blue Cross premiums paid by the employees should be reimbursed to and shared by those eligible employees.

The Union

asserts that to permit the Company to retain the increased refunds or payments after the rate increase of October 1, 1969,
is to unjustly enrich it with refunds attributable in part to
that portion of the Blue Cross premiums paid solely by the employees.
In the alternative the Union asks that the Arbitrators require the Company to pay the full cost of the Blue Cross Premiums (i.e., the premium rate in force from December 1, 1968 to
October 1, 1969 plus the increase in the premium rate thereafter) retroactive to October 1, 1969.

A majority of the Board

of Arbitrators ruled that it would take jurisdiction over and
decide this latter alternative remedial claim as well.
The Company also relies on Exhibit I Part 4 sub-Section (b)
in justifying its retention of all Blue Cross refunds or pay-

- 5 ments.

Accordingly, equally in dispute and before this Board

of Arbitrators is the question:
Whether the Company has the right to receive and
retain all Blue Cross refunds and payments after
the rate increase on October 1, 1969, which increase
was totally paid by the employees.
It is my conclusion that Part 4 sub-Section (b) of Exhibit I is not supportive of the contentions of either party.
In short, I am satisfied that the contract does not cover the
issues in dispute.
The alternative remedy which the Union seeks - to require
the Company to pay the full cost of the Blue Cross premiums can be disposed of first, because it has no bearing on the
disposition of the stipulated issue.

My answer to the Union's

alternative claim would be the same no matter in what sequence
the issues were decided„

The contract makes no provision for

payment by the Company of Blue Cross premiums in excess of the
premium rate in force as of December 1, 1968.

Hence there is

no contractual basis to support the Union's request that the
Company be ordered to pay the higher Blue Cross premium rates.
Nor has there been any practice under which the Company increased its premium payment level during the life of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Therefore, as has been done in the
past, any increase in the Company's Blue Cross premium payment
level remains a matter for bargaining after the expiration of
the Collective Bargaining Agreemant.

Consequently the Union's

alternative remedial claim is denied.
Similarly, neither under the foregoing contract section,
nor elsewhere in the contract, is there provision for the re-

- 6 itnbursement to or the sharing by the eligible employees of any
of the Blue Cross refunds or payments received by or credited
to the Company.

Had the parties intended eligible employees to

share in any of the refunds, especially any portion which was
generated by an increase in premium payments paid by the employees, that contingency would have been expressly stated under Part 4 of Exhibit 1 of the contract.

Indeed it would be a

manifest distortion of the second paragraph of sub-Section (b)
of Part 4, if the sentence:
1(lThe

Company will continue to receive or be credited
with any refunds or payments made to the Mutual Aid
Society by Blue Cross ... "

was interpreted to require any proportionate reimbursement to
or sharing with the eligible employees„
Again under the prior Collective Agreement which included
the present wording of sub-Section (b) of Part 4, there was no
past practice of reimbursing or sharing any of the refunds or
payments received by the Company from Blue Cross with employees
who paid the increase in Blue Cross premiums above the level
paid by the Company.
Accordingly neither by contract language nor practice can
I find a contractual basis covering the remedy which the Union
seeks under the stipulated issue, and therefore its claim for
reimbursement to eligible employees of that portion of the
Blue Cross refunds and payments generated by employee premium
payments after October 1, 1969 is denied.
However, to deny the Union's claim is not to find that the
Company has the right it asserts.

I do not read the second par-

agraph of sub-Section (b) the Company's way.

Obviously the

- 7 second paragraph must be read in conjunction with the first.
Clearly they are reciprocal.

The first requires the Company

to do something - namely to pay all Blue Cross and Group Health
Insurance premiums for the term of the contract at the premium
rates in force as of December 1, 1968.

In other words to fully

cover the premiums of those medical and insurance plans up to
a specified level, without any contribution from the covered
employees.

The second paragraph, as I see it, accords the Com-

pany a proximate benefit - namely the right to receive and retain any refunds or payments made to it by Blue Cross or Group
Health Insurance, resulting from the premiums which the Company
paid. Thus, in exchange for paying all premiums up to a specified
level, the Company is entitled to receive and retain the refunds
generated by its payments up to that level. Indeed that the
first paragraph contains no reference to payment of premiums
above the December 1, 1968 level, makes illogical a conclusion
that the second paragraph applies to refunds generated from payments in excess of that level.
Consequently, the second paragraph of sub-Section (b) was
not intended, and hence does not cover the question of what
shall be done with any portion of refunds or payments which may
have been generated by an increase in the December 1, 1968 premium rate level, and paid by the employees.

Just as I have

found that the second paragraph does not deal with the Union's
claim to a right of participation in the refunds or payments,
I similarly find that the second paragraph does not contractually endow the Company with the right to retain that portion

- 8 of the refunds or payments attributable to premiums above the
December 1, 1968 level paid by the employees.
With this interpretation, what happened under the predecessor contract is immaterial.

That the Company retained all of the

refundsand payments under that contract, even though the increase beyond the contract premium level was paid by the employees, does not mean that the Company now has the right to do
so.

If the Union had the right to object, its failure to do so

under the predecessor contract could well be construed as a
past practice favorable to the Company's interpretation of subSection (b).

But since it had no such right, it did not waive

or relinquish anything, and its failure to grieve cannot be
deemed a past practice.

Nor can it be construed therefore to

give the Company any more rights than it then or presently has.
Put another way, retention of all refunds and payments
by the Company during the prior contract without a claim for
reimbursement by the Union did not constitute a practice which
enlarged the application of sub-Section (b) beyond refunds resulting from Company paid premiums up to the December 1, 1968
level.
Consequently I find that under Exhibit I Part 4 sub-Section
(b) the Company does not have the right to retain that portion
of the Blue Cross refunds or payments generated by employee
premium payments subsequent to October 1, 1969.
In view of my finding that the contract sections relied
upon by both parties are not supportive of their respective
positions, there remains the question of what should be done.

- 9 Threshold to that question is whether the premiums paid by the
employees on and after October 1, 1969 when the Blue Cross
premium rates were increased above the December 1, 1968 level,
in fact generated increased refunds or payments by Blue Cross
to the Company.

I find that that question is persuasively an-

swered by the prior practice of the parties themselves.

Under

prior agreements, before the Company agreed to pay the full
premiums up to a specified level, the parties recognized a direct mathematical relationship between that portion of the Blue
Cross premiums paid by the employees and their percentage of
r e imbur s emen t.
In other words, the percentage of reimbursement to which
employees were entitled from refunds or payments made by Blue
Cross equalled the percentage of the premiums paid by the employees.

So, as stipulated in paragraph I of the Stipulation

of Facts, prior to 1963 the employees received all refunds because they paid all of the Blue Cross premiums.

Thereafter, in

1963, when the employees paid one half of the premiums, they received one half of the refunds.

It follows then that the amount

of money presently in dispute is that portion of the total amount
of refunds and payments received by the Company from Blue Cross
subsequent to October 1, 1969 equal to that percent of the total
premiums which were paid by the employees on and after that date.
Paragraph X of the Stipulation of Facts sets forth the dollar increases in the premium.

The percentages both for individual and

family contracts are thereby readily ascertainable„
Also, based on the procedures for premium payments and refunds, I am satisfied that realistically the increase in premiums

-

- 10 paid by the employees did in fact generate, either directly or
indirectly, increased refunds and payments by Blue Cross to
the Company.

When the medical or hospital bills of an eligible

member are paid by the Mutual Aid Society, the regular Blue
Cross rates for comparable service or comparable hospital accommodations are refunded to the Mutual Aid Society (and the Company) by Blue Cross.

So the Blue Cross refunds are measured

by what Blue Cross would have paid the hospital or other facility.

When hospital rates and the cost of other Blue Cross

services go up, Blue Cross increases its premiums to covered
individuals and families, after obtaining permission from the
appropriate regulatory agency.

Thus, as I see it, when Blue

Cross increased its premium rates on October 1, 1969 above the
December 1, 1968 level, it did so because hospital rates and
rates for other covered medical services had increased or were
expected to increase.

The increased premiums paid by the em-

ployees were designed to cover the increase in Blue Cross costs.
And these increased rates or costs are the amounts of the refunds which Blue Cross paid to the Company after October 1, 1969.
It follows then that the Company received higher refunds
from Blue Cross because hospital rates and the costs of other
medical services had increased; that the premiums paid by the
employees after October 1, 1969 covered Blue Cross' increased
costs; and that the employee premium contributions subsidized,
in part at least, the increased refunds and payments made by
Blue Cross to the Company.
What then should be done with that portion of refunds and

- 11 payments made by Blue Cross to the Company after October 1, 1969
that is equal to the percentage of the total premiums paid on
and after that date by the employees?

I have held that the con-

tract does not provide for reimbursement to the eligible employees; nor does the contract entitle the Company to retain it.

I

can think of no more obvious or classical situation calling for
disposition by collective bargaining„
But because bargaining at this time during the term of the
present collective agreement, might be disruptive to the present
contractual relationship, I direct that the sum of money in question be placed in legal escrow, and that its disposition be the
subject of bargaining between the parties when the Collective
Bargaining Agreement under which they are presently working expires .

Eric JT. Schmertz
Chairman
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FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Lodge #184, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers
Award
and

Continental Can Company, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 7, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Company did not violate the Collective Bargaining
Agreement when it deprived Winfield Thompson of an
opportunity to work during the period June 8 to September 20, 1970.

Uric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July 29,1971
STATE of New York ) ss> .
COUNTY of New York)
On this 29thday of July, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 71A/7520

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Lodge #184, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers
Opinion
and
Continental Can Company, Inc.

In accordance with Article XII Step 4 of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement dated June 7, 1968 between Continental
Can Company, Inc., Plant #88, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and Lodge #184, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the Collective Bargaining
Agreement when it deprived Winfield Thompson of
an opportunity to work during the period between
June 8 and September 20, 1970? If so, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Wilmington, Delaware on June 29, 1971
at which time Mr. Thompson, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.
ed the Arbitrator's oath.

The parties expressly waiv-

The hearings were declared closed

following receipt of the stenographic record.
I find no violation of the contract by the Company's action.
It is undisputed that a part of the grievant's job as an employee
in the Machine Shop labor pool was to relieve on a production

- 2 line which manufactures inserts for bottle caps.

The machines

on that production line are referred to in the record as CLM
machines.

On June 1, 1970 the grievant presented the Company

with a statement from his physician which read:
Mr. Winfield Thompson has been advised not to
work around CLM Machines for any period of time.
This medical statement related to an allergic condition
and adverse physical effect suffered by the grievant from the
fumes attendant to the operation of the CLM machines.
Considering the unconditional nature of this medical statement, which by its own terms precluded any work for any period
of time on the bottle cap production line, I find no fault with
the Company's decision that the grievant was no longer able to
perform the full duties of his job.

Consequently the Company

disqualified him from active work effective June 8, 1970 and
placed him on what it terms as a "medical leave of absence."
The Union contends that despite the medical statement, the
grievant was willing to relieve on the production line for short
intervals of time, but that he objected to assignments that
lasted full shifts or for extended hours within a shift; and
that it was to the latter situation that the medical statement
was directed.

The testimony on what work if any the grievant

was prepared or able to do on the production line is disputed.
However that need not be resolved because the best evidence of
the grievant1s physical capacity to handle any of the disputed
work is the medical statement from his own physician.

And under

that circumstance I cannot find fault with the Company's treatment of that statement, which advises against any work for any

- 3 period of time on the production line, as conclusive.
Additionally the Union contends that the grievant should
have been retained in active employment and assigned other duties, in accordance with Article XI Section 11 of the contract,
which reads in pertinent part;
The Company will give consideration to aged or
partially incapacitated employees for such available lighter work as they are able to perform.
This clause does not place a mandatory obligation on the
Company to find other work for an incapacitated employee.

I£

merely provides that the Company will give such an employee
"consideration" for other work which may be "available." Under
that permissive language I find nothing wrong with the Company's
requirement in this case that the grievant present more specific medical information before it considered
that contract section.

him for work under

In view of the fact that no additional

medical information concerning the grievant's condition and his
ability to perform his regular duties was forthcoming until
shortly before his return to work on September 20, and that no
evidence was presented on the question of "availability" of
other work on June 8, I find no violation of Section 11 during
the interim period while the grievant was off the job.
The Union further contends that as a result of meetings
between it and the Company, the grievant's return to work on
September 20 was under the very same medical conditions and restrictions as existed on June 8.

And that if he was eligible

to work on the latter date there was no reason for the Company
to have disqualified him from active employment in June.
record does not support the premise.

The

- 4The Company was presented with a second medical statement
by the grievant's physician dated September 10, 1970 which read;
Mr. Winfield Thompson is physically able to work
but has been advised to avoid fumes of the CLM
machines for long periods of time.
Substantively, the medical statements of June 1 and September 10, 1970 are different.

Whereas the former advised against

any work for any period of time around the CLM Machine (which
resulted in the Company's decision that the grievant could not
perform part of his regular duties), the latter advises him to
avoid the CLM Machine fumes only for long periods of time meaning that he was physically able to work on or around those
machines for the short periods required when he relieves other
employees„

So the medical information and conditions under

which the grievant returned to work on September 20, as supported by his doctor's statement of September 10, were not the same
as those on June 8 when he was removed from active employment.
Finally the Union points to the fact that on and after his
return to work on September 20, the grievant was not again
assigned for any period of time to the bottle cap production
line.

It points out that other work, as a replacement for that

assignment was obviously found, and that the Company should
have done the same thing on June 8.
puted.

Again the testimony is dist.

The grievant asserts that since his return to work, he

has not once worked on the production line.
ployee believes otherwise.

The weight of the direct evidence

supports the grievant's testimony.
ial.

A supervisory em-

However I find this immater-

For though the Company may have found other work for the

grievant on June 8, I find no contractual requirement, under the

- 5 circumstances of this case, that the Company do so0

Rather the

Company had the right to withhold "consideration" for other work
until more medical information was available, and there is no
evidence incthis record that the other work assigned on and after
September 20 was "available" on June 8.
Accordingly I find no contract violation by the Company's
action of depriving the grievant of an opportunity to work during the period June 8 to September 20, 1970.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Teamsters Local 338
Award
and
Dellwood Dairy Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The discharge of Floyd Toone is reduced to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated without back pay. The period between his discharge
and reinstatement shall constitute the period of
disciplinary suspension and shall be so noted in
his record.

Eric/d.Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: September 3, 1971
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 3rd day of September, 1971, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.
Case No. 71A/10865

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Teamsters Local 338
Opinion
and
Dellwood Dairy Company

The issue involves the contractual propriety of the discharge of Floyd Toone.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on August 10, 1971 at which time Mr. Toone,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives
of the above named Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived

the Arbitrator's oath.
It is well settled that failure to regularly invoke, when
circumstances warrant, a contract work rule that carries a disciplinary penalty, impairs the import, the effectiveness and the
applicability of that rule.
Here the contract provides for summary discharge where an
employee is "under the influence of liquor .... while on duty."
The weight of the evidence supports the Company's charge that
the grievant was under the influence of liquor while working on
May 6, 1971.
However the record also discloses that this was a common
occurrence.

Indeed, the Company conceded that the grievant

- 2worked in an intoxicated condition two or three times a week
over an extended period of time prior to May 6.

Though from

time to time Company representatives spoke to him about it,
the contract rule calling for summary dismissal was never invoked prior to May 6.
In part at least I accept the Union's theory of condonation.

I do not conclude that the Company totally abandoned

its right to discharge the grievant because of prior failures
to impose that contract penalty when the circumstances

warrant-

ed;' but I do find the Company lost its right, at least in the
instant case, to impose a summary dismissal after it had tolerated the grievantrs violations of the work rule so often and
over such an extended period of time.
If a summary dismissal work rule is disregarded, overlooked or waived, the effect is to lull the offending employee into
thinking that the employer does not view the offense as seriously as does the contract; and that the contract penalty will not
be imposed.

Here it is understandable if the grievant, after

drinking to the point of intoxication during his night shift
meal period and returning to work under the influence of liquor
several times a week, believed that May 6 would be no different,
In short, I find that by tolerating the grievant?s improper course of conduct over such an extended period of time and
by not summarily dismissing him earlier as mandated by the
contract, the Company waived its right to do so on May 6.
Instead, and in order to reestablish both the import and
total effectiveness of the work rule prohibiting working while

- 3 under the influence of liquor, the Company must put this grievant, and all other employees similarly situated on appropriate
notice that henceforth the rule will be invoked.

As to the

grievant, that notice cannot now take the form of summary dismissal.

Rather, because I have found factually that he was in-

toxicated while on duty, some penalty is warranted.

And also

that penalty shall serve the purpose of forceful notice to him
that further violations of this or any other work rule carrying a penalty of summary discharge, would in my opinion be
grounds for his immediate dismissal.

The appropriate penalty

under the particular circumstances in this case is a disciplinary suspension to run from the date of his discharge to the
date of his reinstatement as directed in my Award.
The foregoing is not changed by the Company's contention
that the grievant also "refused to obey orders" on May 6, in
violation of another work rule of a summary dismissal type.
Under ordinary circumstances insubordination warrants immediate
discharge.

However, here assuming the accuracy of the Company's

charge (and the evidence is conflicting) that offense is obviously intertwined with the grievant's intoxicated condition.

His

refusal to obey orders was when he was under the influence of
liquor.

A causal relationship between the drinking and the re-

fusal to stack milk as directed by his supervisor cannot be
seriously disputed.

As I see it, a foreseeable result of intox-

ication is an argumentative, adversary and resisting attitude
over a work order which the employee may dispute or dislike.
To tolerate drinking is per force to tolerate such a foreseeable consequence, when that refusal is made while under the

- 4influence of liquor.

Having tolerated the drinking, the Com-

pany must now assume some responsibility for the causal result0
Therefore I cannot accept its argument that May 6 was different
from prior instances because the grievant's drinking that night
was coupled with a refusal to perform a work order.

The two are

so bound together under the facts in this case, that a loss of
the right to summarily discharge for the former, carries a similar waiver as to the latter.
Accordingly, I need not find whether the grievant was insubordinate that night, simply because as already stated I find
that a disciplinary suspension is the appropriate penalty either
way.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

'
'
'
'

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

i

Award and
Opinion

'

The stipulated issue is:
Was the layoff of Louis D'Agostino in violation of
his seniority rights? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on May 28, 1971 at
which time Mr. D'Agostino, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The Union does not dispute the economic need for layoffs
in the Raw Stock Department.
fore the layoff reached

It contends however, that be-

the grievant, the "10% Foreman" Mr.

Lorenzano, who had less departmental seniority than the grievant, should have been laid off.
The question is whether the "10% Foreman" is to be included for layoff purposes, with the "rank and file" as part
of the same job classification within the meaning of Section 7
(1) of the contract; or rather, whether the "10% Foreman" is
a different classification from in this instance, Raw Stock

- 2 clerk, and subject to layoff only within the Foreman category
irrespective of the layoffs and seniority of Raw Stock Clerks.
I find a contractual presumption in favor of treating the
"10% Foreman" as part of the Raw Stock Clerk classification
for purposes of layoffs.

Schedule A of the contract is entit-

led "Classifications of Work and Rates."

No where in that

schedule is the "10% Foreman" or the Working Foreman or the <x
Sub-Foreman listed as a classification.

The Raw Stock Depart-

ment enumerates only Raw Stock Clerks, Raw Stock Handlers and
Head Raw Stock Receiver (the latter two not involved in the
instant dispute.)

In short, Schedule A which contractually

enumerates two job classiciations, does not include the Foreman
job assignment.

Accordingly Section 16 of the contract, parti-

cularly Section 16 (e) cannot be construed as establishing the
Foreman assignment as a job classification.

Instead, I am sat-

isfied that its purpose and intent is limited to fixing a pay
premium of 10% above the existing classification, for performance of certain supervisory duties.

I interpret it to mean

that the supervisory job assignment carries a 10% premium above
the highest base rate of the classification of the affected
employee.

In other words, narrowed to the instant dispute, the

"10% Foreman" is paid the highest base rate of his classification
plus 10% for performing certain supervisory work; but he remains classified pursuant to that base rate, namely as a Raw
Stock Clerk.
The intent and spirit of the relationship between the
"10% Foreman" and the "rank and file" in sharing the available
work is found, I believe, in Section 9, though it relates spec-

- 3 ifically to sharing overtime.

In substance that Section pre-

cludes either a preference or disadvantage to the Foreman in
the allocation of overtime work; permitting him to participate
in

regular departmental overtime on precisely the same basis

as the rank and file.
A
•/

To my mind that means not only that

ii&r
contractually there may be neither a preference for/a restraint
/•
on the Foreman's entitlement to the extra available work together with the "rank and file" in his department, but that
implicitly and reciprocally no preference should be accorded
the Foreman if the available work falls below a full regular
quantity.

But contrary to this intent, a Foreman would enjoy

such a proscribed preference, if though junior in seniority,
he is retained in a layoff situation and thereby continues at
work while others within the rank and file who enjoy greater
departmental seniority, are laid off.
Finally I consider it significant that the "10% Foreman"
is within the bargaining unit and covered by this Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
supervisory functions

Though undisputedly he performs

certain

(like a group leader or leadman) he can-

not be considered a managerial supervisor because he is not encompassed within the managerial ranks.

The Company's argument

in this case, that the Foreman must be retained or dealt with
separately in layoff situations because of the essentiality of
his supervisory assignment, and because his layoff might paralyze
the work of the department, endows these bargaining unit Foremen with the kind of supervisory authority ordinarily attached
to managerial supervisors who are excluded from the bargaining
unit for that very reason.

Absent proof in this area, 1 am not

- 4 persuaded that the "10% Foreman" who is covered by this Collective Bargaining Agreement as part of the bargaining unit enjoys
that level of importance or authority.

Also I think the Com-

pany exaggerates the impact of a ruling favorable to the Union
in this case.

It suggests that a determination which combines

the "10% Foreman" with the rank and file for purposes of layoff
would cripple its ability to operate the various departments
involved.

The fact however/ is that the circumstances in the

instant dispute are unique.

Both sides recognize that in the

overwhelming number of situations the "10% Foreman" is an employee with the highest seniority in the department, and therefore under any theory, not reachable in a layoff unless the
less senior rank and file employees of the department have been
laid off first.

So as a practical matter, the concern express-

ed by the Company is most unlikely to develop.
The evidence on Industry practice and the practices of
this Company do not change the foregoing.

Uncontroverted is

the Union's testimony that elsewhere in the Industry, involving
Employers covered by this same master Agreement, departmental
layoffs include the working Foreman and the rank and file as a
group within the same classification.

So apparently, absent

evidence to the contrary, other employers faced with the same
adverse economic conditions, have managed to maintain the remaining production even where a "10% Foreman" junior to employees in the "rank and file" is laid off.
The evidence advanced by the Company in connection with
its practice is neither sufficiently extensive nor sufficiently
comparable to the instant dispute to be controlling.

I cannot

- 5 consider only two prior layoffs (in the Developing Department
and in the Printing Department) to be of the quantity or consistency required to establish a "past practice."

Also it

appears that in the layoffs in these two departments, though
affecting the rank and file first, and the foremen later (i.e. as
separate groups) the foremam involved possessed higher seniority than any of the others first laid off.

Hence under the

Union's theory in the instant case, those layoffs were and would
not be objectionable to the Union.

And therefore the Union's

failure to grieve in those instances cannot be deemed prejudicial to the Union's position here.

Instead, as I previously in-

dicated, the facts in the instant case are unique; indeed the
first time that the problem has arisen.

Here, as distinguished

from any other prior departmental layoff, the "10% Foremen"
just happened to be junior in the seniority to the rank and file
Raw Stock Clerks; hence for the first time, in an unusual circumstance, the problem arose and the grievance was filed.
For all the foregoing reasons I am persuaded of a contractual presumption in favor of treating the "10% Foreman" in the
Raw Stock Department as part of the Raw Stock Clerk classification.

Consequently he should have been included amongst the

other Raw Stock Clerks for purposes of the layoffs which took
place on or about Friday, May 21, 1971 in accordance with
Section 7 (1) of the contract.

As such, because his department-

al seniority was less than that of the grievant's, his layoff
should have preceded the latter's, and because the layoff went
no further, the grievant would and therefore should not have

- 6 been laid off at all.

Accordingly he shall be reinstated and

made whole for the time lost.
As the Permanent Arbitrator in the Industry I wish to make
it clear that the presumption which I have fashioned in deciding this case, is just that - a presumption.
deemed irrebuttable.

It should not be

For example, though in this case I have

not been persuaded that the supervisory work of the "10% Foreman" in the Raw Stock Department (where only one Stock Clerk
and one Foreman remain) mandates the retention of Mr. Lorenzano,
there may be other situations where, based on evidence presented, the retention of a foreman, albeit junior in seniority, is a
compelling business necessity.

In other words, the presumption

may be rebutted if the Foreman's supervisory function is essential and I am persuaded that there is no other bargaining unit
employee realistically and contractually able and willing to
assume the supervisor assignment, and/or no managerial supervisor similarly available.

Then the implicit right of the Com-

pany and its manifest need to continue the department at work
to meet remaining business needs, would negate the presumption
and allow the retention of the less senior foreman.

But this

exception to the presumption was not shown in the instant case.
I do not know for example that the remaining senior Raw Stock
Clerk, Mr. Contino, lacks the ability or willingness to assume
Mr. Lorenzano's supervisory assignments; or that other senior
employees elsewhere in the Laboratory are unqualified or unwilling to accept a transfer to that work; or that the managerial supervisory force would be unable to cope with or absorb

- 7the supervisory work in the event of Mr. Lorenzano's layoff or
his replacement by some other employee.
the Company's case herein.

(This is not to critize

Obviously it could not know or an-

ticipate the presumption On which I rely until the rendition of
this decision.)
Therefore I want the parties to clearly understand that the
contractual presumption involved in deciding the instant case
is not irrebuttable and therefore not absolutely controlling in
all departmental layoffs.

Instead it is a presumption favorable

to the Union's argument that the Foreman and the rank and file
are to be deemed within the same classification; but rebuttable
on a case by case basis as indicated.

For this reason I think

it fair and appropriate that the Arbitrator's fee in the instant
case be shared equally by the parties.
Accordingly the Undersigned, as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and having heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following Award;
The layoff of Louis D'Agostino violated his seniority
rights. He shall be reinstated and made whole for the
time lost.
For reasons stated in the Opinion the Arbitrator's fee
shall be shared equally by the parties.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: June 7, 1971
STATE OF New York )SS-.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 7th day of June, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same
Case No. 7lQ(l)

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

IIIn the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory '
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
'
1

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

'
i
'

Award and
Opinion

The stipulated issue is;
Was the transfer of Philip Latnendola from negative
to positive developing a violation of his seniority
rights? If so what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on March 18, 1971,
at which time Mr. Lamendola, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived0

This proceeding is in the nature of a "declaratory judgment" to determine which of two employees, the grievant or
Robert Twilley (who was also present at the hearing) is entitled to a single available negative developing job.
The answer turns on whether Twilley, who concededly had
more seniority than the grievant as a negative developer,
abandoned or relinquished that seniority.

I conclude he did

not.

While working as a negative developer Twilley became ill
and underwent a serious operation.

Upon his return to work,

at his request, and in apparent recognition of his need for a

- 2 period of recuperation, he was permitted to work at the less
demanding task of positive developing, though he retained his
negative developing classification and the higher rate of pay
of that classification0

This arrangement was agreed to by the

Union and Company and confirmed in a letter dated April 22,
1969 from Mr. Quigley to Mr. Vitello.

Though that letter states

that Twilley "will return to negative developing when the first
opening occurs," I am satisfied the parties intended to allow
him to remain in positive developing until his health permitted
him to return to the more difficult negative developing work.
Therefore unless it can be established that Twilley was physically capable of assuming the negative developing job on a full
time basis when first, one, and then a second job opening for
that classification was posted, his failure to bid in each instance cannot be deemed prejudicial to his seniority rights as
a negative developer.
The evidence in the record does not support a conclusion
that at the time those two openings were posted the grievant
had sufficiently

recovered from his illness to resume work in

that classification on a full time basis.

It is undisputed

that at that time, and at the request of the Company he did
perform assignments as a negative developer, on a straight
time and overtime basis, and he concedes also that he worked
occasional "double shifts."

But he also testified, without refu-

tation, that it was very difficult physically for him to do so;
that he was not fully able to perform that work on a regular
continuing basis; and that he did it out of a sence of obliga«,_

tion to the Company because it had allowed him to retain his

- 3 negative developing classification and rate of pay while working as a positive developer during his recuperation.

I find no

reason why his explanation and characterization of his physical
condition at the time he willingly undertook negative developing
assignments, should not be believed and accepted.
Also, though I appreciate the grievant's equitable argument
that he should not have been removed from negative developing to
make room for Twilley after the latter passed up two posted
openings in that classification, I find no contractual reason
why Twilley was obliged to either bid for those openings or
claim those jobs in order to keep his seniority as a negative
developer.

While Twilley worked as a positive developer, he re-

tained the negative developing classification and the higher
rate.

So there was no need for him to seek a classification or

rate of pay which he already enjoyed.

Also it is undisputed

that job postings are promotional in nature - from a lower to a
higher classification, rather than to a specific job opening.
So, put another way, because Twilley remained classified at the
higher negative developing level there was no "promotion" for
him to seek or claim.
This is not to say that an employee, ready and able to
assume regular work in a higher classification to which his
seniority attaches, cannot abandon his seniority rights to
that position by failing to claim job openings when they occur.
Rather it is that I do not find that the particular facts in
this case can be interpreted to have reached that point.
Accordingly, the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator un-

- 4 der the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above nam
ed parties, makes the following AWARD:
Because Robert Twilley had neither abandoned nor
waived his seniority rights as a negative developer, the transfer of Philip Lamendola from negative to positive developing was not a violation
of Mr. Lamendola's seniority rights.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally by
the parties.

Eric . Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April 12, 1971
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 12th day of April, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual desxribed in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Gas No. 70 A-13

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
, „ . _
_
_
.
(
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

East Side Airlines Terminal Corp.

'

and

'

t

AWARD

Airline Aerospace Employees Local
732 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the above named parties, and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
Employer; the above named Union having failed to appear at
a hearing after due notice, makes the following AWARD:
The Union violated the "No Strike" provisions of
the contract, when on July 23, 1971 it initiated
and directed a one hour work stoppage by 12 employees0
The work stoppage was not only proscribed by the
contract, but unnecessary. The dispute between the
Union and Employer, relating to "death in the family
benefits," was a classical disagreement over the
application and interpretation of a specific contract
clause, and as such was properly and exclusively a
matter for discussion, resolution or adjudication
under the grievance and arbitration clauses of the
contract.
The grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract are fully capable of redressing all grievances
over the application and/or interpretation of the contract. The Union and aggrieved employees can be made
whole through the use of those procedures if the Employer has acted improperly or in violation of the
contract,,
Resort to "self help" in the form of a work stoppage
is therefore as much an unjustified alternative remedy as it is prohibited by the contract.

- 2 -

Accordingly the Union and its members shall cease
and desist from any such further or future work
stoppages during the term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
/

Eric J./Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December 29, 1971
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York) '" " "
On this 29th day of December, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

Case No. 1330 0924 71

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Newspaper Guild of New York
Findings
and
Award

and
El. Diario Publishing Company, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether Esli Gonzalez is entitled to notice pay
and vacation pay for 1969?
The claim for notice pay is denied, but the claim for
vacation pay is granted on a pro rata basis.
Under the contract a principal condition for "notice pay"
is a discharge with finality.

Though the grievant was initial-

ly discharged, that was not his final status.

Rather, his dis-

charge was changed to a suspension by Arbitrator Daniel G.
Collins.
attached.

Had the discharge been upheld, notice pay would have
But it was not, and any right to notice pay was

thereby vitiated.
I am satisfied that Arbitrator Collins1 Award should be
interpretated in a traditional manner.

The grievant's re-

instatement "without back pay" means a deprivation only of
back wages.

The customary and traditional interpretation of

the phrase "without back pay" neither disposes of nor denies
other contractual benefits during the period of time the
affected employee is suspended.

Accordingly Arbitrator Collins'

Award was not intended to nor did it deprive the grievant of

- 2 his accrued vacation entitlement for the period of time he
actively worked during 1969.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, having been duly sworn and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following Award;
The claim for notice pay is denied; The claim
for vacation pay for the year 1969 for Esli
Gonzalez is granted on a pro rata basis for
the period of time he was actively at work during that year (excluding the period of his suspension under the Award of Arbitrator Daniel
G. Collins.)

Eric J./^thmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February 22, 1971
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 22nd day of February, 1971, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

1330 0888 70

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Licensed Practical Nurses of New York, Inc.
Award
and

Elizabeth Horton Memorial Hospital

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows;
Contract Term
The duration of the new contract shall be 18 months
and 1 day, from June 30, 1970 through December 31,
1971. The Association's demand for a wage re-opener during the life of the contract is denied.
Wages
The present salaries of all LPNs, including the
starting salary, shall be increased across the
board by the following amounts, effective as indicated:
An increase of 14c an hour effective June 30, 1970
An additional increase of 100 an hour effective
January 1, 1971.
An additional increase of 8<; an hour effective
July 1, 1971.
Association Security
The Association's demand for a "Union Shop" is granted, but prospectively, covering LPNs hired on or
after the date of this AWARD. Other LPNs shall continue to be covered by the same Association Security
clause as under the expired contract. The "Union Shop"
provision shall require Association membership after
90 days of employment„

- 2Vacations
In addition to the present benefits of two weeks
vacation with pay to full time LPNs with one or
more years of service, and 3 weeks vacation with
pay for LPNs with 3 years of service or more, the
new contract shall provide for 4 weeks of vacation with pay for full time LPNs with 10 or more
years of service.
Leaves of Absence
The Hospital's present practice shall continue.
The Association's demand for 9 contractual paid
leave days for educational seminars, is denied.

Uniform Allowance
The Association's demand for a uniform allowance
is denied.
Sick Leave
The Association's demand for an increase in the
number of paid sick leave days from the present
10 to 12 per year, and its demand for retention of the
provision of paying for unused sick leave, are granted.
Holidays
The Association's demand for an increase in the number of holidays or personal days is denied,
Benefits Fund
As under the predecessor contract the Hospital shall
continue to pay for Blue Cross, Blue Shield, Malpractice and Disability Insurance. The Hospital shall
also contribute the sum of $6.11 per month for each
LPN to the Beneficiary Fund of Licensed Practical
Nurses to cover the cost of Major Medical, Dental and
other benefits of that Fund as agreed to by the Trustees,
not now provided by the Hospital
Overtime
The Association's demand for a change in the conditions for payment of overtime is denied,
Annual Increments
The annual increment shall be increased to $3.60
per week or $187.20 a year, effective June 30, 1970

- 3 Shift Differential
The present shift differential of $2.40 per day shall
be increased to $3.00 per day effective June 30, 1970,
Premium Pay
The present extra pay of $2.00 for each "in-charge"
shift shall be increased to $3.25 per shift for the
LPN in charge, effective June 30, 1970.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: April 26, 1971
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ' " :
on this 26th day of April, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of State, County
& Municipal Employees District Council 37
and

Award

Queens Borough Public Library
During the hearing in the above matter the above named
parties reached a settlement of the dispute.

At the request

of the parties I make the Settlement Stipulation my AWARD, as
follows :
Without prejudice to the positions of the parties,
the parties have settled and withdrawn this arbitration on the following basis:
1. The period of time
September 28, 1970
plinary suspension
Decker's personnel

from August 7, 1970 to
shall be deemed a disciand so noted in Mrs.
record.

2. Without prejudice to the period of time in #1
above being deemed a disciplinary suspension,
the Library shall make Mrs. Decker whole for
the pay she lost during that period. Also there
shall be no break in her seniority due to the
suspension.

Eric X. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 8, 1971
STATE OF New York ) Ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 8th day of April, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 1330 0725 70
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 89 United Papermakers and
Paper-workers, AFL-CIO

Award

and
Federal Paper Board Co., Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated July 16, 1969 to July 15, 1971
and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Mr. Radis Fears is entitled to five weeks vacation
pay for the vacation year 1970 under Article X of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 16,
1969.

CjLM^&**«***+S\c /.
Arbitrator

dated; July
1971
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this V* day of July, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

Case No. 1330 1239 70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Local 89 United Papermakers and
Paperworkers, AFL-CIO

'
'
'

and

Opinion

i

Federal Paper Board Co., Inc.

'
i

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 16, 1969 to July
15, 1971, between Local 89 United Papermakers and Paperworkers,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Federal
Paper Board Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issue:
Is Mr. Radis Fears entitled to five weeks vacation
pay for the vacation year 1970 under Article X of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 16,
1969.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in New York City on May 24, 1971 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The Company filed a post hearing brief.

The Company denied Mr. Fears, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant," vacation pay for the year 1970 because he worked no time during that year.

He was on a non-occupational sick

leave of absence throughout 1970.

It is agreed and stipulated

that if he is entitled to vacation pay for the vacation year
- 1970 under the contract, his entitlement would be for five weeks.

- 2 A determination of this dispute turns on the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article X Section 1 of the contract which reads:
Employees who have been continuously in the employ
of the Company for twenty-five (25) years or more
shall be eligible for five (5) weeks' vacation with
pay during that calendar year.
Generally, absent a contract provision to the contrary,
it is well settled that an employee on leave because of sickness is still "employed," albeit without direct salary or wages.
In other words his period of employment or continuous employment is not suspended or interrupted by a non-occupational medical leave of absence unless the contract expressly so provides.
I conclude that this interpretation is applicable in the
instant casev
The contract does not use the phrase active employment,
which is traditionally used when periods of extended illness or
non-occupational medical leaves of absence are to be excluded
from calculating uninterrupted employment.

Nor does this con-

tract use any other language excluding periods of illness or
non-occupational medical leaves of absence from the phrase
"continuously

in the employ of the Company."

The third paragraph of Section 5 of Article X, which sets
forth the method of paying vacation pay to employees returning
from military service or Workmen's Compensation leaves of absence would have been the appropriate place to include a restrict
ion on vacation pay eligibility for employees on non-occupational medical leaves of absence during the vacation year.
it does not, when such a circumstance was clearly fore-

That

- 3 seeable means that an exclusion was not intended, leaving the
only variation to Workmen's Compensation and military leaves.
Also, the phrase "continuous service," which I deem synonymous with "continuously in the employ" is used and defined in
the Pension Plan Booklet prepared by the Company and incorporated by reference into the Collective Bargaining Agreement under
Article XIX of the contract.

"Continuous service" under the

provisions of that Plan is broken, among other reasons, by a
non-occupational disability or leave of absence of more than
two years duration. Though admittedly for pension purposes only,
it seems to me that had the parties intended a different or
more restricted interpretation of the phrase "continuously in
the employ of the Company " for vacation pay
the contract would have explicitly so stated.

under Article X,
That it does not

constrains me to conclude that synonymous phrases should be interpreted with equal liberality.

Or in short, the phrase as it

applies to vacations should be no less liberal than it applies
to pensions.
However, most significant, in my judgment is the first
paragraph of Section 5 Article X of the contract, which sets
forth the method of computing the amount of vacation pay.

It

fixes that amount not based on the earnings of the employee during the calendar year of the vacation, but rather on a percentage of his gross earnings of the previous calendar year.
deem this as evidence of the parties intent.

I

It seems to me

that they intended to determine an employee's vacation eligibility not on his service during the year he takes or claims a
* vacation, but instead on the amount of hours worked during and

- 4 his gross earnings of the prior year.
In other words if he worked the requisite hours during
the prior year two factors are determined.

First those hours,

together with the gross earnings produced therefrom determine
the amount of money he is to receive in vacation pay during the
subsequent year.

And second, by doing so he has met the test

of eligibility for vacation pay in the subsequent year, whether he works during that subsequent year or not.

In the instant

case the grievant worked the requisite number of hours during
the prior year (from January to the latter part of July, 1969)
and thereby established not only the basis for the amount of
his vacation pay, but also his eligibility of a vacation for
the following year 1970.
None of the foregoing is overturned by the Company's case
on past practice.

The examples advanced by the Company, where

employees were not granted vacations during a vacation year in
which they performed no work, are not determinative because
all involved employees who retired or quit.

I accept the

Union's explanation that because those employees retired or
quit and made no claim for vacation pay, their particular situations did not come to the Union's attention.

Eric ST. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, Local 119

Award

and
General Electric Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated 1970-1973 and having been duly
sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Awards, as follows:
The discharge of Arliss Thomas was for just cause.

Eric /df. ^Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October 15, 1971
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 15th day of October, 1971 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0
Case No. 1430 1081 71 M-H

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 119
and

'
'
t
'
'

Opinion

'
r

General
- - - _ Electric
_ _ _ _ _ Company
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ '
i
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Arliss Thomas? if not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in the Philadelphia offices of the
American Arbitration Association on July 27, 1971 at which
time Mr. Thomas, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant,"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

Post

hearing briefs were filed„
The Company charges the grievant with a second violation
of a major work rule - namely "sleeping during working hours
or hiding with the intent to sleep" on the night of October 8,
1970.

A few months earlier, in June of 1970, the grievant was

suspended for "sleeping, insubordination and striking a supervisor," also a "major"offense.
The Company delineates disciplinary offenses as "major"
and "minor."

A second major disciplinary offense or a second

breach of a major work rule carries the penalty of discharge.
The existence of the work rules involved in this case together
with the Company's two step disciplinary procedure are estab-

- 2 lished in the record to my satisfaction.
The Union contends that the grievant was not sleeping on
the night of October 8, 1970; that if he committed any offense
it was simply a late return to his work station following a
lunch break (a "minor" offense); and that in any event it was
not his second breach of a major work rule.
It is undisputed that two guards found the grievant in the
dark in an unused ladies wash room, seated on a chair with his
feet propped up, after the resumption of his work shift following the lunch break.

Based on the record before me I am per-

suaded that he was asleep.

The testimony of the guards, de-

scribing the grievant1s appearance and demeanor, when considered with the remoteness and condition of the location, strongly
support the conclusion that he was asleep.

More important, and

determinative to my mind is the grievant's own testimony.

He

stated that on other occasions he had gone to that wash room
to "rest" during the lunch break.

Presumably on those occas-

ions he was able to resume his work on time after the lunch
break ended.

Yet this time he was not able to do so.

He ad-

mitted that on this occasion he went to the wash room without a
watch or any

other means of determining when, as a matter of

time, the lunch break would be over.

He stated that he expect-

ed to be able to return to work on time because, as in the past,
he would hear the machines and see the start-up of work.

That

he did not see or hear the "start-up" this time suggests only one
logical conclusion - that he was unable to do so because this
time he was asleep„

- 3 The question narrows to whether he committed a major
offense of "sleeping during working hours or hiding with the
intent to sleep."
affirmative.

Based on his past record I must hold in the

It is undisputed that he, like other employees

doze off during their lunch break.
objected to by the Company.

This is not and was not

But the grievant, unlike other

employees, was unable, on at least two prior occasions, to
rouse himself at the end of the lunch break.

At least twice

his supervisor had to wake him and instruct him to return to
work0

Contrary to the Union's contention, this conduct was

neither accepted nor acquiesced in by the Company.

The griev-

ant was warned by his superior that the Company could not tolerate sleeping past the end of the lunch break.

In short, as

I see it the Company put the grievant on notice that if he
slept during his lunch break he did so at his peril, and would
be subject to disciplinary action if he was unable to awaken
in time to resume work.
Obviously, any attempt to determine whether the grievant
went to the unused ladies wash room during his lunch break on
October 8, 1970 for the express purpose of sleeping beyond
that break would be speculative.

I do conclude that he went

to that location on a floor different from his work station to
either rest or sleep during the lunch break.

In doing so he

placed himself in a prejudicial position for which he alone
must be responsible.

He knowingly ran the risk of falling

asleep, and again sleeping into the regular working hours of
his shift, at a location where no one could awaken him.

Im-

- 4prudently, when he had a duty to be careful, he failed to
heed his supervisor's prior admonition regarding sleeping past
the lunch break; and disregarded both the seriousness and consequences of another sleeping offense following his disciplinary suspension of three months earlier,,

Consequently, as an

offense it went well beyond a mere isolated failure to report
back to work on time; but rather reached the level of an unjustifiable disregard of a major Company rule.
There remains only the question of whether this constitued the grievant's second offense.

The Union correctly argues

that at the time the grievant was discharged, his prior disciplinary suspension of June, 1970 was still pending in the
grievance procedure and had not been adjudicated on the merits.
And that therefore on October 8, 1970 the Company could not
authoritatively determine that the offense that night was a
second major offense.

However, by the time the instant case

came to arbitration on July 27, 1971, any procedural defect
had been cured, and the Union's argument was moot.

By that

date the Union had failed to process the grievance protesting
the initial disciplinary suspension to arbitration within the
contractually prescribed time limit.

Hence by the time the

instant arbitration case began, the prior disciplinary penalty
was no longer subject to challenge by the Union and therefore
stood as imposed - a first major offense within the meaning of
the Company's rules and its progressive disciplinary procedures,
And the October 8th incident is therefore the second major
offense.

Consequently the penalty of discharge was mandated

and justified.

^

ac JV Schmertz
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
and

"
'
i
'
'

Award

General Electric Company
Caribe Plant Operations and
General Electric Circuit Breakers

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated July 22, 1970 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The discharge of Luz Pabon Sandoval is reduced to
a one month disciplinary suspension. She shall be
reinstated but without back pay.

*****^\z

Eric A. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June 1, 1971
STATE OF New York )SS-.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 1st day of June, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

'

I

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO

'
'

and
General Electric Company
Caribe Plant Operations and
General Electric Circuit Breakers

'

Opinion

'
'
'

In accordance with a Strike Settlement Agreement dated
July 22, 1970 between General Electric Company, Caribe Plant
Operations and General Electric Circuit Breakers, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute over the propriety of the discharge of Luz Pabon Sandoval and whether she
should be reinstated.
Hearings were held in San Juan, Puerto Rico on February 5
and 6, 1971 at which time Mrs. Sandoval, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's oath was expressly waived.
This proceeding was closely tried in considerable detail
by the parties over the equivalent of three hearing days and
both sides filed post hearing briefs.

A careful study of the

entire record persuades me that a determination of the issue

2
boils down to a matter of proof.

Therefore I shall deal with

that matter and accordingly, except as they relate to the
matter of proof, find unnecessary a recitation and analysis of
all the facts and contentions advanced by the parties during
the course of the hearing.
The Company charges that the grievant had a "poor attitude"
about her work and a record of excessive absenteeism and lateness; and that on August 6, 1969 she engaged in "horse play"
in the plant, and used obscene language and struck a fallow
employee.

The Company asserts that considering her entire re-

cord, her discharge, triggered by the events of August 6, 1969
was justified.
There is no doubt in my mind that the Company considered
all of these charges in deciding on the penalty of discharge.
But I am persuaded that the most serious charge was that of
striking a fellow employee and that the Company decided upon
the penalty of discharge because of that act.
The grievant denies that charge (striking employee Delores
Correa in the back with her fist as both walked down the plant
aisle).

She also disputes the charges of "poor attitude" (which
" are the subject of several "contact reports" in the grievant's

personnel record); admits the first part of the charge of
horse play (untying or pulling a kerchief off one employee's
head) and does not dispute her record of absenteeism and lateness but offers explanations in mitigation (marital difficulties and illnesses of her child, herself and immediate family).
This is a disciplinary case with the burden on the Company

- 3 to prove its reasons for the discharge by clear and convincing
evidence.

The record in connection with the charges of "poor

attitude," horse play and excessive absenteeism and tardiness
meet this test.

But the evidence on the critical act, namely

the assault, has not been proved to the level of the traditional standard.
Based on the grievant's own admissions and uncontroverted testimony of witnesses, I am convinced that the grievant
dried her hands on the shirt of a fellow-employee or engaged
in some similar act, (the disputed part of the "horse play"
charge) and pulled the kerchief off the head of another employee during working hours on August 6, 1969.

That the Company

complained and spoke to her about her "poor attitude" is substantiated in'Various contact reports "and the persuasive testimony of managerial representatives.

Her chronic record of ab-

senteeism and lateness is not seriously disputed, and there is
no question that the Company warned her about it.
But the evidence on the alleged assault is inconclusive
one way or the other.

Miss Correa testified to it, together

with the nature of the obscene language which the grievant
allegedly used in conjunction with striking her.
denial was equally vigorous and equally unshaken.

The grievant's
The testi-

mony of employee Nilda Reyes who stated that she saw the
assault was, in my judgment, equivocal and indecisive (by example, she could not describe or act out how the grievant struck
Miss Correa).

And the Company declined to produce at the hear-

ing Miss Reyes' written report of the incident.

The testimony

- 4 of Santiago Velez in support of the grievant's position is similarly inconclusive.

He stated that the saw and heard the

grievant and Miss Correa talking and overheard unflattering
comments each to the other, but saw no assault or fight.

Yet

I am not persuaded that he was on the scene long enough or
gave the situation sufficient attention to be able to know with
certainty whether there was or was not an assault.

The balance

of the evidence regarding the alleged assault comes from secondary sources and cannot be deemed determinative.
Consequently the record before me on the critical question of whether the grievant aggressively struck Miss Correa
is both unclear and a stand-off.

As such it fails to achieve

the clear and convincing level traditionally required in disciplinary matters.

This is not to say that the grievant did

not commit the assault; but rather that the evidence in the
record does not support that contention up to the standard of
proof required.
Hence the issue narrows, without the required proof of
assault, to whether the grievant's discharge was justified on
the remaining grounds.

I conclude it was not.

Work attitude,

absenteeism and horse play are grounds singly or collectively
for disciplinary action.

But it is well settled, that absent

a specific contract provision or an explicit work rule which
attaches the penalty of summary discharge to those offenses,
the principle of "progressive discipline" is to be used where
those offenses have been committed.

In other words the penal-

ty of discharge for those offenses is proper only as the final
penalty after the employee's record has failed to improve follow-

- 5 ing the lesser penalties of warning and suspension.

In the in-

stant case neither the contract nor the Company's booklet incorporating its work rules provide for summary dismissal for
these offenses (as it does by contrast for "fighting").

In

other words, it is clear that a poor work record, absenteeism
and tardiness and horse play, although offenses subject to disciplinary action, are not amongst those carrying the penalty of
summary dismissal.
Also the nature of the particular horse play involved, albeit of potentially serious consequences, was not, in my judgment, so manifestly dangerous or malicious as to warrant anything more than a moderate penalty within the "progressive discipline" formula.

The grievant's absenteeism and tardiness,

the extent and scope of which I deem to be excessive, cannot
be totally excused even if beyond her fault because of illnesses
and marital difficulties.

It is well settled that in the inter-

est of production requirements, an

employer need not tolerate

an employee's unpredictable attendance no matter what the cause
and even if beyond the employee's control.

Therefore no matter

how bona fide the grievant's explanations may be, they are irrelevant to the Company's right to require better attendance of her.
Critical however is the fact that though the grievant was
notified and warned about her work attitude and record of absenteeism and tardiness, the Company took no further step to
impress upon her that a failure to improve would place her job
in jeopardy.

But that is the purpose of the principle of "pro-

gressive discipline."

For single offenses which are not in

- 6and of themselves serious enough to warrant summary dismissal,
the process of warning and then suspension, before the ultimate
penalty of discharge is designed not only to notify the employee that he might lose his job if his record does not improve,
but also to serve as a rehabilitative measure.
So far as the grievant's work record and absenteeism are
concerned, the Company did not go beyond the warning step and
thereby did not afford the grievant this traditional notice
and opportunity before imposing the penalty of discharge.

And

as already indicated the horse play incident, whether treated
separately or added to the grievant's prior work record was
not so serious as to justify by-passing the suspension penalty
within the "progressive discipline" formula.
In short, absent proof of the assault, the remaining
offenses warrant some disciplinary penalty but less than discharge.

Considering the entire record I am satisfied that the

appropriate penalty is a suspension of one month.
Accordingly, the grievant's discharge is reduced to one
month's disciplinary suspension to run for a period of one
calendar month from the date of her discharge.
reinstated.

She is to be

I have decided not to award her back pay for the

balance of the period of her dismissal because I am not satisfied that she made an adequate effort to seek other employment, and hence mitigate damages during the period of her unemployment.

I am mindful of the fact that the Puerto Rican

economy during this period has been slow if not recessionary.
But mitigation does not require that an employee achieve other
- employment; Jxft rather only that he made a good faith effort

- 7 to seek it.

I do not think the grievant made that effort.

Eric J\Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Cemetery Workers and Greens Attendants
Union, Local 365 Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO

Award

and
Greenwood Cemetery

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having been duly sworn and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
1. The grievance of Henry Schuler for additional
pension payments is denied.
2. The grievances of those employees listed in
the Union's letter of May 3, 1971 are granted. They shall receive for the year 1971 the
greater amount of vacation time which they had
received in the immediate prior year(s,,).

Eric J.. Schmertz

DATED- November 15, 1971
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 15th day of November, 1971, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.
Case No. 1330 0551 71

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Cemetery Workers and Greens Attendants
Union, Local 365 Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO
Opinion
and
Greenwood Cemetery

In accordance with the Arbitration Agreement between
Local 365 Cemetery Workers and Greens Attendants Union, AFLCIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Greenwood
Cemetery, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer," the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issues:
1. What additional pension payment, if any is
due Henry Schuler?
2. What is the proper additional vacation time
due, if any, to the employees listed in the
Union's letter of May 3, 1971?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on August 5, 1971 at which time representatives of the Union and Employer appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.
present.

Affected employees were also

The parties filed post hearing briefs.

The contract documents applicable to these cases are the
1967-1968 "Basic Contract;" the arbitration Award of Arbitrator Hugh E 0 Sheridan dated May 6, 1970 and his subsequent explanatory letter dated August 10, 1970.
The Union contends that Mr. Schuler did not receive full
credit towards his pension entitlement for his earlier period

- 2of service as a seasonal employee, pursuant to Section 3 of
Mr. Sheridan's pension decision which reads:
When a seasonal employee becomes a regular employee
his total months of employment shall be added from
the beginning of his employment and applied to all
service as a regular employee for purposes of retirement benefits.
In addition to including the full time he worked as a
regular employee, Mr. Schuler received only 60% credit for
his previous service as a seasonal employee (referred to as
"Regular B"), as provided in the Pension section of the Basic
Contract.
The question simply is whether, as applied to Mr. Schuler's
grievance, Mr. Sheridan's Award eliminated the aforementioned
60% provision and substituted in its place full credit for
periods of seasonal employment for those employees who thereafter became regular employees.
I answer the question in the negative.

Section 3 of

Mr. Sheridan's pension decision must be read together with his
explicit explanation in his letter of August 10, 1970.

His

explanation reads:
Page 4 - Pension, Section 3 - This clause applies
to a seasonal employee who becomes a regular employee on or after January 1, 1971.
This explanation excludes Mr. Schuler.
ular employee prior to January 1, 1971.

He became a reg-

Mr. Sheridan has ex-

plained that Section 3 of his pension decision is applicable
prospectively - only for employees who had both seasonal and
regular service, but who became regular employees on or after
January 1, 1971.

Accordingly Mr. Schuler's pension rights

- 3 remain determined by the Basic Contract provisions applicable
and
to employees who had worked both seasonally/regularly, and
who became regular employees before January 1, 1971.
Nor can I accept the Union's contention that Schuler is
entitled to greater pension credit under that portion of
Mr. Sheridan's Award which reads:
Where benefits in a contract are presently in excess of those specified herein, there shall be no
lowering of present working conditions.
^

The contract in existence between the parties prior to
Mr. Sheridan's Award did not provide for a pension benefit in
excess of those specified in his decision.

And more specifi-

cally, Mr. Schuler had not previously enjoyed a higher retirement benefit than that which the Employer accorded him in the
instant case.

Therefoxe I find no basis upon which the "con-

tinuation of prior better benefits" ruling can be invoked in
this grievance.
Therefore the Employer accorded Mr. Schuler the correct
amount of credit for his service as a Regular B (seasonal)
employee as well as the correct amount of credit for his subsequent service as a regular employee under the Pension provisions of the Basic Contract.

And as the Sheridan Award did

not alter the applicability of those provisions to Mr. Schuler,
his grievance for additional pensions payments must be denied.
The latter argument, namely, the application of Mr. Sheridan's ruling continuing benefits in excess of those specified
in his Award, though inapplicable to the Schuler grievance,
is, in my judgment, determinative of the grievances of those
*

employees listed in the Union's letter of May 3, 1971.

It is

- 4undisputed that those grievants received greated vacation
benefits in prior years than they received in 1971.

1 find

it immaterial whether this was caused by crediting them for
periods of seasonal employment as well as regular employment;
by a partial integration of seasonal and regular seniority
lists; or because of a clerical error.

The fact is that in

prior years each of the grievants received more vacation than
the Employer contends they are now entitled to under the
Sheridan Award.
As to those grievants I deem their prior vacation eligibility to be "a working condition" and "benefit" within the
meaning of Mr. Sheridan's ruling in the second paragraph of
page 2 of his Award.

Accordingly irrespective of the specific

vacation provisions set forth in that Award, the prior vacation
benefits which these grievants enjoyed shall be continued.
Accordingly those employees listed in the Union's letter of
May 3, 1971 shall receive the greater amount of vacation which
they had received in the prior year(s).

Eric J/Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

i
t

Cemetery Workers and Greens Attendants
Union, Local 365 Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO

i
i
i
i
i
i
i

and
Greenwood Cemetery

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having been duly sworn and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
1. The grievance of Henry Schuler for additional
pension payments is denied.
2. The grievances of those employees listed in
the Union's letter of May 3, 1971 are granted. They shall receive for the year 1971 the
greater amount of vacation time which they had
received in the immediate prior year(s/).

Eric y'. Schmertz

DATED1: November 15, 1971
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 15th day of November, 1971, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.
Case No. 1330 0551 71

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Cemetery Workers and Greens Attendants
Union, Local 365 Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO
Opinion
and
Greenwood Cemetery

In accordance with the Arbitration Agreement between
Local 365 Cemetery Workers and Greens Attendants Union, AFLCIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Greenwood
Cemetery, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer," the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issues:
1. What additional pension payment, if any is
due Henry Schuler?
2. What is the proper additional vacation time
due, if any, to the employees listed in the
Union's letter of May 3, 1971?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on August 5, 1971 at which time representatives of the Union and Employer appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.
present.

Affected employees were also

The parties filed post hearing briefs.

The contract documents applicable to these cases are the
1967-1968 "Basic Contract;" the arbitration Award of Arbitrator Hugh E0 Sheridan dated May 6, 1970 and his subsequent explanatory letter dated August 10, 1970.
The Union contends that Mr. Schuler did not receive full
credit towards his pension entitlement for his earlier period

- 2 of service as a seasonal employee, pursuant to Section 3 of
Mr. Sheridan's pension decision which reads:
When a seasonal employee becomes a regular employee
his total months of employment shall be added from
the beginning of his employment and applied to all
service as a regular employee for purposes of retirement benefits.
In addition to including the full time he worked as a
regular employee, Mr. Schuler received only 60% credit for
his previous service as a seasonal employee (referred to as
1'Regular

B"), as provided in the Pension section of the Basic

Contract.
The question simply is whether, as applied to Mr. Schuler's
grievance, Mr. Sheridan's Award eliminated the aforementioned
60% provision and substituted in its place full credit for
periods of seasonal employment for those employees who thereafter became regular employees.
I answer the question in the negative.

Section 3 of

Mr. Sheridan's pension decision must be read together with his
explicit explanation in his letter of August 10, 1970.

His

explanation reads:
Page 4 - Pension, Section 3 - This clause applies
to a seasonal employee who becomes a regular employee on or after January 1, 1971.
This explanation excludes Mr. Schuler.
ular employee prior to January 1, 1971.

He became a reg-

Mr. Sheridan has ex-

plained that Section 3 of his pension decision is applicable
prospectively - only for employees who had both seasonal and
regular service, but who became regular employees on or after
January 1, 1971.

Accordingly Mr. Schuler's pension rights

- 3 remain determined by the Basic Contract provisions applicable
and
to employees who had worked both seasonally/regularly, and
who became regular employees before January 1, 1971.
Nor can I accept the Union's contention that Schuler is
entitled to greater pension credit under that portion of
Mr. Sheridan's Award which reads;
Where benefits in a contract are presently in excess of those specified herein, there shall be no
lowering of present working conditions.
The contract in existence between the parties prior to
Mr. Sheridan's Award did not provide for a pension benefit in
excess of those specified in his decision.

And more specifi-

cally, Mr. Schuler had not previously enjoyed a higher retirement benefit than that which the Employer accorded him in the
instant case.

Therefore I find no basis upon which the "con-

tinuation of prior better benefits" ruling can be invoked in
this grievance.
Therefore the Employer accorded Mr. Schuler the correct
amount of credit for his service as a Regular B (seasonal)
employee as well as the correct amount of credit for his subsequent service as a regular employee under the Pension provisions of the Basic Contract.

And as the Sheridan Award did

not alter the applicability of those provisions to Mr. Schuler,
his grievance for additional pensions payments must be denied.
The latter argument, namely, the application of Mr. Sheridan's ruling continuing benefits in excess of those specified
in his Award, though inapplicable to the Schuler grievance,
is, in my judgment, determinative of the grievances of those
*

employees listed in the Union's letter of May 3, 1971.

It is

- 4 undisputed that those grievants received greated vacation
benefits in prior years than they received in 1971.

I find

it immaterial whether this was caused by crediting them for
periods of seasonal employment as well as regular employment;
by a partial integration of seasonal and regular seniority
lists; or because of a clerical error.

The fact is that in

\r years each of the grievants received more vacation than

the Employer contends they are now entitled to under the
Sheridan Award.
As to those grievants I deem their prior vacation eligibility to be "a working condition" and "benefit" within the
meaning of Mr. Sheridan's ruling in the second paragraph of
page 2 of his Award.

Accordingly irrespective of the specific

vacation provisions set forth in that Award, the prior vacation
benefits which these grievants enjoyed shall be continued.
Accordingly those employees listed in the Union's letter of
May 3, 1971 shall receive the greater amount of vacation which
they had received in the prior year(s).

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

New York City
Office of Collective Bargaining

In the Matter of the Fact Finding
between
Committee of Interns and
Residents of New York City

Report and
Recommendations of
the Impasse Panel

and
New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation

Case No. 1-69-70

Before the Impasse Panel
Dr. Emanuel Stein, Chairman
Daniel G. Collins
Eric J. Schmertz
Appearances
For Committee of Interns and
Residents of New York City
Murray A. Gordon, P.C., Attorney for the
Committee of Interns and Residents of New York City
by Murray A. Gordon, Esq.
Michael J. Horowitz, Esq. of Counsel
For New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation
Proskauer, Rose, Goetz &
Mendelsohn, Esqs., Special Counsel for
New York Health and Hospitals Corporation
by L. Robert Batterman, Esq., of Counsel
Robert H. Pick, Esq., Assistant
Director of Labor Relation of
the City of New York

The proceeding takes place pursuant to Section 1173.7. OC
of the New York City Collective Bargaining Lav/, Chapter 54
of the Administrative Code.

The Impasse Panel held a total of

ten daily hearings between January 13 and March 23, 1971 and,
in addition spent one full day observing the work of interns
and residents at Kings County Hospital.

The testimony filled

1447 pages and 69 exhibits, many multiple, were received in
evidence.

Each party submitted a post-hearing brief and the

Committee of Interns and Residents submitted a reply brief,
the last being received on April 9, 1971.

Thereafter the

Impasse Panel met in executive session,-

The Background of the Impasse

The Committee of Interns and Residents of New York City
(the "CIR") is the duly recognized bargaining representative
for interns and residents (sometimes referred to collectively
as "house staff officers") employed by the New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation (the "Corporation").

On September 30,

1970, the contract between the Corporation's predecessor, the
City of New York, and the CIR expired.

Thereafter, negotiations

for a new contract between the Corporation and the CIR reached
an impasse.
There are a total of 1,112 house staff officers in the
bargaining unit represented by the CIR, all but 67 of whom are

employed in one or another of five Corporation hospitals:

Bellevue,

Harlem, Bronx Municipal Hospital Center, Kings County and
Metropolitan.

The distribution of interns and residents by

class of positions is as follows:
Intern, Dental Intern
1st year Resident and Dental Resident
2nd year Resident and Dental Resident;
Junior Psychiatrist-lst year Resident
3rd year Resident; Junior
Psychiatrist-2nd year Resident
4th year Resident; Junior Psychiatrist2nd year Resident
5th year Resident
6th year Resident

220
258
276
205
119
24
10

Interns and residents are employees of the Corporation.

At

the same time, their work is prescribed by and fulfills the requirements of professional training programs approved by the
American Medical Association.
approved medical schools.

Interns must be graduates of

Internship is not in New York, as in

a number of states, a prerequisite to licensure for medical

i
practice, and a large percentage of theCorporation's interns
are so licensed.

In any event the internship year generally

is regarded as a desirable, if not essential, experience for a
beginning physician.

While advanced medical school students also

receive clinical training, the internship is the medical graduate's
first intensive exposure to clinical practice under conditions
of professional and legal responsibility.
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Completion of an internship is a prerequisite to acceptance in a residency program.

The content and duration of such

programs must be approved by the American Medical Association.
Completion of a residency program ("Board eligibility") is a
prerequisite for "Board certification" as a specialist in a
particular branch of medicine.

While such certification is not

a legal or professional requirement for specialty practice,
given the present policies of major hospitals on patient-admitting privileges for physicians, board eligibility or Board certification is as a practical matter necessary for such practice
in most, if not all, urban areas.
Within the Corporation's hospitals, it appears to be
structurally intended that interns work under the direct supervision of first-year residents.

Residents are to be supervised

by other residents in the year senior to them in their specialty, and there is a chief resident.

Ultimate responsibility for

patient care and for supervision of interns and residents in
each specialty is vested in a chief of service and attending
physicians, who normally hold professional rank in the voluntary hospitals and the major medical schools with which the
Corporation's hospitals are affiliated or associated.

In

practice, however, because of the volume of work, the hours
worked and especially in emergency wards, interns and residents
often handle problems on their own initiative without prior
consultation with a "supervisor," and not infrequently without
any consultation at all.
Internship and residency programs are intensive educational experiences, in which the medical school graduate pro-4-

gresses first to proficiency in basic clinical techniques and
skills and ultimately to a high level of competence in a specialized field.

This training is accomplished primarily through

work experience at every level, and substantially

supplemented

by participation in "grand rounds" and attendance at lectures
conducted by more experienced physicians.
Internship and residency programs are extremely
both in terms of time and energy.

demanding

Long hours with frequent

nights on-call, often with few opportunities for rest, are the
rule.

This is in part due to the limited number of house staff

officers which the Corporation can accommodate in approved
internship and residency programs, in which each participant
must be rotated through a large variety of clinical experiences,
There is no question that house staff officers in the Corporation's hospitals provide a high level of medical care for patients and that patient care understandably takes precedence
over all other of their activities.

The patients whom the

Corporation's hospitals serve are for the most part from the
underprivileged sections of the City, and these hospitals are
most often the sole providers of medical service for those communities . Both the quality of and the emphasis upon patient
care do not, of course, minimize the role of the programs as
training instrumentalities

for the production of highly skilled

specialists.
Not many years ago house staff officers were essentially
regarded as tra.inees and paid a very small stipend.

As late

as 1961, interns in the City hospitals were paid $2900 inclusive of living out allowance, and this figure had increased to

only $5430 by 1967.

However, the next year saw a substantial

rise in house staff salaries, with the salary scale of $5430
to $7330 for intern to sixth year resident replaced by a scale
of $9000 to $12,000.

Under the most recent CIR contract, for

the period October 1, 1969 to September 30, 1970, the following salary scale, inclusive of $1500 annual living-out allowance, was in effect:
Intern, Dental Intern
1st year Resident and Dental
Resident
2nd year Resident and Dental
Resident
Jr. Psychiatrist-lst year
Resident
3rd year Resident; Junior Psychiatrist-2nd year Resident
4th year Resident; Junior Psychiatrist-3rd year Resident
5th year Resident
'
6th year Resident
Chief Resident differential

$10,300
11,000

11,500
12,000
12,500
13,000
13,500
500

The 1969-1970 contract between the CIR and the City, provided, as of January 1, 1970, an annual Welfare Fund contribution of $125 per house staff officer.

Interns and residents

received three and four weeks' annual vacation, respectively,
with the proviso that any vacation could be reduced by one week
as required by the "needs of a given service," in which case
the affected house staff officer received one additional week's
salary.

The City also provided fully paid health and hospital

insurance and acted as malpractice indemnitor.

There was no

pension plan for house staff officers.
The CIR
The CIR contends that interns and residents, collectively,
are fully qualified physicians; that they render vital medical
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service to the hospitals; that that service is much greater than
the training they receive from their work; and that they should
be granted pay and other benefits accordingly as follows:
1. Effective October 1, 1970, a salary, inclusive of
living out allowance, of $15,000 for interns, and for residents
a salary scale from $17,500 to $25,000 in five equal annual
steps, with a differential of $1500 for chief residents.
2. When any given residency requires a prerequisite
residency in a different specialty, the residency year for .
salary purposes be calculated on the basis of cumulative tenure.
3. A $250 annual Welfare Fund contribution per house
staff officer.
4. Reimbursement for tuition upon satisfactory completion
of courses, conferences or workshops approved by the appropriate medical boards of each hospital in cumulative sum not to
exceed $350 per annum for each house staff officer.
5. On-call rooms accommodating not more than two house
staff officers, with hot water, shower and toilet facilities
for each two rooms.
6. Reduction of vacation only in the event "unanticipatible emergency" requires the house staff officer's presence,
with vacation time worked at the requirement of the Corporation
paid for at the same rate as that paid to per session physicians.
7. A salary increase, in the event the consumer price index for New York City at the end of any contract year exceeds
the index at the end of the preceding contract year by more than
three percent, of a percentage equal to the cost-of-living percentage increase above three percent.
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In its post-hearing brief

the CIR has modified this proposal to require only that its
contract be reopenable for negotiation of a cost-of-living
clause if the City or the Corporation should grant such a
benefit to any other labor organization.
The Corporation's Responses
1. In its post-hearing brief, the Corporation has set
forth a salary counterproposal which would in three steps over
a thirty-three month period beginning October 1, 1970, establish a salary scale from $12,000 for interns to $16,300, exclusive of chief residency differential, for 6th year residents.
The Corporation proposes that for the period October 1, 1970 to
September 30, 1971, interns be paid $10,900 and 1st year residents $11,600, with a differential of $500 for each successive
residency year, to a maximum of $14,100 for 6th year residents;
that for the period October 1, 1971 to September 30, 1972, interns be paid $11,500 and 1st year residents $12,200, with a
differential of $600 for each successive residency year to a
maximum of $15,200; and that for the period October 1, 1972 to
June 30, 1973, interns be paid $12,100 and 1st year residents
$12,800 with a differential of $700 for each successive residency year to a maximum of $16,300.
2. The Corporation has not stated a position on the treatment for salary purposes of years spent in a prerequisite residency.
3. The Corporation has proposed a $25 per year increase
in its Welfare Fund contribution, to a total of $150,
October 1, 1971,
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4. The Corporation has rejected the CiR's proposal for
tuition reimbursement.
5. The Corporation has rejected the CIR's proposal regarding on-call facilities insofar as it would require major
renovation.

The Corporation has proposed, within the limits of

physical space, and finances, to make reasonable efforts to upgrade on-call facilities and to give greater attention to the
sufficiency of such facilities in any new construction.
6. The Corporation has rejected the CIR's proposal regarding vacations.
7. The Corporation has rejected both the CIR's original
and modified proposals for a cost-of-living clause.
Discussion
A.

Salaries
We believe that several basic conclusions must be drawn

from the voluminous record in this proceeding:

First, the interns

and residents in the Corporation's hospitals are professional employees who, under taxing conditions, perform services essential
to the life and health of millions of residents of the City including particularly those in underprivileged communities, and
these facts must be accorded significant weight in setting their
salary scale.

Second, without in any way detracting from their

professional status and service, interns are nevertheless beginning
professionals undergoing their first intensive clinical experience,
a part of which is recognized, training, and there is a wide gap between their skill levels and responsibilities and those of the residents, particularly the senior and chief residents.

Third, the

City is beset by an unprecedented financial crisis which is net
of its making and which it does not have at present the economic
or legal resources to resolve.

This financial problem is equal-

ly relevant to every new contract settlement with every organization representing City or Corporation employees.

Irrespective

of the absolute dollar cost of any such settlement, which is a
factor of the number of employees involved and the City's share
of salary and other benefit costs, principles of fairness and
practicability require that the financial plight of the City be
taken into account in an even-handed manner.

The financial cri-

sis of the City is such that even the correction of demonstrated
salary scale inequities may have to be postponed or at least
minimized.

Fourth, the cost-of-living in New York City, as meas-

ured by the Consumer Price Index, has increased appreciably since
the last upward adjustment of house staff officers' salaries, and
a new contract for house staff officers must at a minimum restore
their real income position.
Taking into account all of the foregoing factors, we believe
that the following is a fair and reasonable salary scale, inclusive of living out allowance, for house staff officers for the
two year period beginning October 1, 1970:
Eff. Oct. 1, 1970
$11,300

Intern, Dental Intern
1st year Resident and Dental
Resident
2nd year Resident and Dental
Resident; Junior Psychiatrist-lst
year Resident
3rd year Resident; Junior Psychiatrist- 2nd year Resident "
4th year Resident; Junior Psychiatrist-Bra year Resident
-10-

Eff. Oct. 1,1971
$12,300

12,300

13,300

13,000

14,000

13,700

14,700

14,400

15,400

5th year Resident
6th year Resident
Chief Residency Differential

15,100
15,800
700

16,100
17,800
700

This salary scale would increase the intern's salary by
$1000 as of October 1, 1970 and another $1000 as of October 1,
1971, and would, retroactive to October 1, 1970, increase the
intern-to-first year resident differential from $700 to $1000
and increase the differentials for each other residency year and
for chief residency from $500 to $700, except for the sixth year
of residency where, because of demonstrated experience, skill
and service, we feel there should be, in the second year of the
contract, a substantial and further monetary differential totalling $1700 over the fifth year resident.
As of October 1, 1971,
the resultant salary for the 6th year resident would be $17,800
and if a chief resident, $18,500.
For the intern, the recommended salary scale represents,
on the present base, a 9.7 percent increase per year retroactive
to October 1, 1970, and more than offsets the 7.4 percent rise
in the consumer price index during the period of 1969-1970.

More-

over, in establishing as a first step an $11,300 salary for the
intern for the period ending September 30, 1971, the recommended
scale places the intern generally within the current salary range
for comparable beginning professional employees in the City service.

The recommended scale also places the current salary of

the interns in the Corporation's hospitals above that in all but
a few of the voluntary and public hospitals in the New York area
that have been called to our attention and would as of October 1,
1971, be matched in only one such hospital.

The recommended cur-

rent salary for interns would also place their salary ahead of
the scale in all but one other public or voluntary hospital in
the United States that has been called to ovir attention.
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While

we wish that our recommended salary for interns in the Corporation's hospitals was exceeded by none, we cannot in good conscience, particularly in the face of the City's prevailing financial crisis, recommend a higher figure.
We believe that the recommended increases covering residents in the differential between internship and residency years,
the differentials between residency years and the chief residency
differential, are amply supported by the greatly increased skill
and responsibility levels of physicians as they progress from
medical school graduates to highly competent resident specialists.
The Corporation itself has apparently recognized this in offering
differential increases in its salary counterproposal.

At the 6th

year resident level we are, for example, recommending a salary
that will be approximately 45 percent greater than the interns'
salary as of October of this year, as compared to 31 percent under the most recent contract.

Were it not for the present finan-

cial crisis we would be inclined to recommend even further improvements at the senior resident levels.
In making the foregoing salary comparisons we are aware of
the CIR's objection to use of position titles without supporting
evidence to show comparability of duties and working conditions.
Normally this objection would be well taken, but it is not persuasive in this case, where the position titles are specifically
descriptive of progress through internship and residency programs
whose content is prescribed on a uniform, nationwide basis by the
American Medical Association.

We are also aware of the CIR's ob-

jection to comparisons with public or voluntary hospital salaries
-12-

established other than by collective bargaining.

We are dis-

posed to give greater weight to the results of collective negotiations but we cannot disregard other situations, particularly
when they constitute a substantial segment of the whole picture.
We note in connection, however, that the salary scales we recommend would for the current period as well as after October
1, of this year, exceed by a substantial degree the scale established pursuant to fact-finding at the Boston City Hospital and
would exceed by an even greater degree that established at the
Washington, D.C., General Hospital after a work stoppage.

Only

at Los Angeles County Hospital will collective negotiations have,
produced a higher scale, and for the reasons we have stated we
do not believe that the Corporation and City can reasonably be
expected to match the Los Angeles figures.
In making our salary recommendations we have given only
small weight to the CIR's suggestion that salaries for house
staff officers be set by reference to hours worked by interns
and residents and-hourly rate-of-pay comparisons with nonprofessional or part-time professional employees.

As profes-

sionals in various fields, ourselves, we know that the long
hours spent in pursuit of professional competence, particularly
in the beginning years of practice, cannot realistically be a
measure of professional, compensation.

We do not mean to sug-

gest, though, that the Corporation has a license to require
house staff officers to work or be unreasonably on-call for as
many hours at it chooses.

We understand that the hours worked

by interns and residents reflect the substantive requirements

of their particular training programs and the implication of
those requirements for the staffing of services.

The matter of

the per session physician's rate of pay in the Corporation's
hospitals has also been stressed to us.

However, per session

physicians are only part-time employees and their service takes
place entirely outside the context of the internship and residency programs.

Moreover, if the per session rate were to be

the measure of their salaries, house staff officers would, on
a comparable work-time basis, have to be paid at the rate of
approximately $56,000 per annum.

The CIR has not, however, in

its contract proposals or arguments suggested anything like
this level of compensation for house staff officers.

Under the

circumstances we do not believe that the per session rate is a
determinative factor in the new salary scale for interns and
residents.
We are similarly disinclined to give weight to any suggestion that house staff officers, for salary purposes, be
treated akin to industrial apprentices with their compensation
levels progressing toward the median salary level of attending
physicians in the Corporation's hospitals.

In fact, when this

suggestion was presented directly to the CIR's very experienced
expert witness, he responded negatively.
We believe that the approach we have taken is the sound
one.

We view house, staff officers as valuable public servants

who are entitled to a beginning professional salary scale that
recognizes their varying levels of skill, experience and supervisory responsibility.

In this connection, we can see no
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justification, given the valuable and intensive services house
staff officers perform, for any "discount" against their compensation to reflect educational costs of the training programs
in which they participate.

Nor do we believe that we can or

should speculate on what would be the cost or other consequences
of attempting to substitute for house staff officers some other
system of hospital staffing.
If our salary recommendations are accepted, they will entail substantial retroactive salary adjustments.

We would in

any event wish such adjustments to be made as promptly as possible.

Prompt payment of retroactive salary is particularly

important in the case of the interns and residents, at least
some of whom will complete their programs and leave the Corporation's service at the end of this academic year.
B.

Calculation of Residency Years
We discern no justification, and none has been suggested

to us, for not including, for salary purposes, time spent by a
resident in another, prerequisite residency.

Moreover, recog-

nition of such cumulative service is apparently now the practice
in at least some Corporation hospitals.

Accordingly we recom-

mend that the CIR's proposal on this point be accepted.
C. Welfare

Contribution

The City has agreed in its City-wide contract with District
Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO, to increase its welfare contribution for the
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great majority of its employees to $175 per annum per employee
effective January 1, 1971 and to $250 effective January 1, 1972.
No evidence or persuasive argument has been presented to us
that the same benefits should not be accorded to house staff
officers.

Accordingly we recommend the Corporation's welfare

fund contribution for each house staff officer be increased to
$175 per annum effective January 1, 1971 and to $250 effective
January 1, 1972.
D. Tuition Reimbursement
Reimbursement

for tuition, to the extent that it is avail-

able for any City or Corporation employee, is provided as an incentive to improve work competence and advancement through education in the employee's field.

This justification for tuition

reimbursement hardly seems applicable to the house staff officer,
who as a participant in an internship or residency program is
engaged in a rigorous educational program leading to professional certification in the field of the house staff officer's interest and service.

We recommend that the CIR's proposal for

tuition reimbursement be rejected.
E.

On-Call Facilities_
The testimony concerning on-call facilities,, as well as

our own observations of such facilities at one Corporation
hospital, convinces us that adequate sleeping quarters and related conveniences often are lacking.

On the other hand, the

CIR's proposal for limits on room occupancy and the number of
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persons using other facilities obviously could not be implemented in many hospitals without dislocation of patients, new
construction, or major structural renovation.

Given the pres-

ent financial plight of the City, major construction expenditures for this purpose cannot realistically be recommended.
The Corporation, though, has offered to give emphasis in future
construction to on-call facilities, and to provide for reasonable refurbishing of existing facilities to the extent that
major structural changes and/or large costs are not involved.
We think that the Corporation's proposal represents the direction to be taken.

Accordingly we recommend that the Corporation

agree to take reasonable steps to up-grade on~call facilities
to the extent this may be accomplished without new construction,
major structural renovation or other large costs.

We also re-

commend that a joint Administration-CIR committee be established at each hospital concerned to develop proposals for implementation of the foregoing recommendations.
F. Vacations
Presently vacations may be reduced to the extent of one
week to accommodate the "needs of a given service," with compensation, in addition to vacation pay, at the house staff
officer's regular rate for any such vacation time worked.

The

CIR proposes to permit reduction only in the case of "unanticipatable emergency" and also to pay for vacation time worked at the per session rate.

"Unanticipatable emergency," we

understand, would not encompass the difficulty of providing va-
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cation period coverage occasioned by the prescribed size of the
normal house staff.

i

!
i

We cannot recommend either of these proposals.

Given the

I
fact of internship and residency programs, and the varying
limitations that they impose on staffing of services, we do not

t

believe it would be fair to the Corporation or the patients to
i

require that a service be covered by part-time employees where
the normal staffing pattern of interns and residents would not
provide coverage during the vacation period.

Moreover, the

present vacation arrangements guarantee interns two weeks off
and residents three weeks.

We also agree with the Corporation

that house staff officers should not be paid at the per session
rate for work performed within the context of their particular
internship and residency programs.

Accordingly, we recommend

that the CIR's proposals regarding vacations be rejected.
G.

Cost of Living
No contract between the City or the Corporation and an em-

ployee organization currently contains a cost-of-living escalator".

The CIR initially sought such a benefit, but has now mod-

ified its original proposal to permit contract reopening for negotiation of such a clause in the event any other employee organization is granted one.
We feel very strongly that sound labor relations are best
served by contracts that establish definite terms and conditions of employment for their duration.

And we believe that

there has been ample demonstration both in the public and pri-
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I

vate sectors of the undesirability of contract clauses that relate benefits for employees covered thereby to benefits that
may subsequently be obtained by other groups of employees.

We

must, on the basis of our knowledge and in good conscience, recommend that the CIR's proposal on cost of living be rejected.

Dated:

May 12, 1971
:3L^LA^
:
-i * ~IL

; ilAJiju^
;
Emanuel Stein

aniel G. Collins

State of New York )
County of New York SS :
On this twelfth day of May, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Emanuel Stein, Daniel G. Collins and Eric J. Schmertz,
to me known and known to me to be the individuals described in and
who executed the foregoing instrument and they acknowledged to me
that they executed the same.

ERNEST DOER3MSI
ft.fcirn Public, State ol N*w
sanw.x
Q 03-6054500
d m BEOIUE Qpunty
expires Starcf 30, 18 / /-
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 145 Glass Bottle Blowers Association
and

Johns-Manville Products Corporation

'
'
i
'
'
'
i

Award

'

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above named parties, and dated March 5, 1970 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards
as follows:
The grievances of Messrs. Galati and Stevenson
are not arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May

1971

STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 145 Glass Bottle Blowers Association
and

Johns-Manville Products Corporation

'
'
i
'
"
'
i
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article 20 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective March 5, 1970 between Johns-Manville
Products Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
and Local 145 Glass Bottle Blowers Association, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute relating
to the grievances of Messrs. Galati and Stevenson.
A hearing was held in Bellmawr, New Jersey on May 12, 1971
at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to collectively as the "parties," appeared. The
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The threshold question is whether the grievances are arbitrable.
The Company contends that the grievances are not arbitrable
because the Union failed to move them from the third step of
the grievance procedure to the fourth step within the prescribed time limit.

The pertinent contract section reads:

Step 4. If the grievance is not settled in Step 3,
the International Representative shall contact and
arrange a meeting with the Plant Manager within seven
(7) days after completion of Step 3 for the purpose
of trying to resolve the issue0
The Union concedes it did not request the fourth step
meeting within the seven days referred to above. It explains

- 2 that a shortage of international representatives; the illnesses
of others and compelling negotiations elsewhere impeded its
ability to comply with the seven day limit.

It asserts however,

that in its contractual relationships with employers generally,
such time limits are not rigidly observed.
The amount of time between the completion of the third
step and further word from the Union (either the Local or the
International) is not disputed.

The third step was completed

on October 30, 1970; and not until December 2nd, slightly more
than one month later, did a representative of the International
Union contact the Company's Employment Relations Manager regarding the grievances.
As I see it the sole question is whether the time limits
set forth in the various steps of the grievance procedure are
mandatory or merely directory.

Many cases, in other contract-

ual relationships, have supported the "directory theory," especially where compliance with the time limits, though not precise, has been deemed substantial.

But I cannot support that

view under this contract and under the instant circumstances.
A delay of one month, no matter what the explanation, cannot
be deemed as"substantial" compliance with a seven day requirement.

Moreover, the language of the grievance procedure, in-

sofar as the time limits are concerned, clearly shows that
they were intended to be strictly adhered to and therefore mandatory.
Step 1 of the grievance procedure states in its concluding sentence:

- 3 "All prescribed time limits in the subsequent
steps of this procedure may be extended by
mutual agreement."
That means of course, that absent mutual agreement the
time limits may not be extended.

Also, if the parties had not

intended the time limits to be specifically followed, there
would be no need or purpose for a contractual provision allowing for extensions by mutual agreement.

Moreover, each time

limit within each step of the grievance procedure is prefaced
in its execution by the word "shall,"

which under traditional

and customary contractual interpretation means "must."

Under

the foregoing contract language, as in the other steps of the
grievance procedure, the movement of a

grievance to the next

higher level "shall" be done by the appropriate Union Representative within a set time limit - in the instant case seven
days,
It is undisputed that there was no extension of that time
limit by mutual agreement.

Also, based on the record before

me, it is clear that throughout this contractual relationship
there has not been a single instance in the processing of any
grievance in which the prescribed time limits were unilaterally
ignored by one party and acqui^ced in by the other; nor indeed
has there been even an instance in which the time limits have
been extended or waived by mutual agreement.

Rather the prac-

tice has been strict adherence to each time limit set forth in
each step of the grievance procedure,,
Accordingly I must find that in negotiating these time
limits the parties intended that they be strictly adhered to
unless mutually extended or waived.

The Arbitrator is bound

- 4 by terms of the contract.

Therefore, absent any practice or

evidence of a waiver or extension of the time limits (and the
conversation between the Local Union President and the Plant
Manager subsequent to Step 3, is altogether too hazy and inconclusive in this regard to be construed as a waiver or an
extension) I must find the Union bound to those time limits as
written.

Hence the grievances of Messrs. Galati and Stevenson,

because they were not processed from the third to the fourth
step of the grievance procedure within the required time limit,
may not be processed further to the arbitration stage.

Eric /. Schmertz
Arbitrator

